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ABSTRACT 
 
The relationship between the climate change and human rights regimes has been the 
subject of much scholarly debate. The Paris Agreement and work carried out under 
the auspices of the Human Right Council have shed new light on states’ 
understanding of the interplay between these two bodies of law. This chapter analyses 
these recent developments, placing them in the context of the scholarly debate on the 
fragmentation of international law, analysing means to avoid conflicts and exploit 
synergies between the climate change and the human rights regimes. 
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1 Introduction: The interplay between human rights and climate change law 
 
The adverse effects of climate change threaten the enjoyment of a range of human 
rights, such as the right to life, adequate housing, food, and the highest attainable 
standard of health.1 Qualifying the effects of climate change as human rights 
violations, however, poses a series of technical difficulties, including disentangling 
complex causal relationships and projections about future impacts.2 Conversely, 
measures adopted to tackle climate change may themselves have (and indeed have 
reportedly already had) negative impacts on the enjoyment of human rights.3 This is 
especially the case for activities affecting access to and use of natural resources, such 
as land, water and forests. Adaptation and mitigation action can interfere with the 
enjoyment of human rights, such as that to culture, the respect for family life, access 
to safe drinking water and sanitation, indigenous peoples’ self-determination, as well 
as the gamut of procedural rights concerning access to information, justice and 
participation in decision-making.4 While climate change response measures can 
engender perverse outcomes for the protection of human rights, human rights 
protection can also engender problematic outcomes, when it is pursued without 
factoring in climate change obligations.5 
 
This complex relationship between climate change and human rights obligations has 
increasingly been recognized in the literature,6 as well as by human rights bodies. 
Starting with 2008, the Human Rights Council (HRC) has adopted a string of 
                                                
1  Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report on the 
Relationship between Climate Change and Human Rights, UN Doc A/HRC/10/61, 15 January 2009, at 
16. 
2 Ibid., at 70.  
3 Ibid., at 65-68.  
4 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the issue of human rights obligations relating to the 
enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment, UN Doc A/HRC/31/52, 1 February 
2016, at 50-64. 
5  See for example Pedersen, ‘The Janus-Head of Human Rights and Climate Change: 
Adaptation and Mitigation’ 80 Nordic Journal of International Law (2011) 403; and Lewis, ‘Balancing 
Human Rights in Climate Policies’ in O. Quirico and M. Boumghar (eds.), Climate Change and 
Human Rights: An International and Comparative Law Perspective (2016) 39.  
6 See for example S. Humphreys (ed.), Human Rights and Climate Change (2009); Special 
issue, 38 Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law (2009); Rajamani, ‘The Increasing 
Currency and Relevance of Rights-Based Perspectives in the International Negotiations on Climate 
Change’ 22 Journal of Environmental Law (2010) 391; S. McInerney-Lankford, M. Darrow and L. 
Rajamani, Human Rights and Climate Change. A Review of the International Legal Dimensions 
(2011); O. Quirico and M. Boumghar (eds.), Climate Change and Human Rights: An International and 
Comparative Law Perspective (2016); and Special Issue, 34 Journal of Energy & Natural Resources 
Law (2016).  
 resolutions emphasising the potential of human rights obligations, standards and 
principles to ‘inform and strengthen’ climate change law- and policy-making, by 
‘promoting policy coherence, legitimacy and sustainable outcomes’.7 The HRC also 
encouraged its special procedures mandate holders to consider the issue of climate 
change and human rights within their respective mandates.8 As a result, the special 
procedures mandate-holders unprecedentedly engaged with the making of the Paris 
Agreement, suggesting, amongst others, the inclusion of human rights language in the 
treaty, and that Parties refrain from viewing their human rights responsibilities as 
stopping at their borders.9 
 
 
This impassionate plea was laden with potentially significant legal implications. As 
not all Parties to climate treaties have ratified human rights treaties, adhesion to the 
Paris Agreement could have become a means to impose upon states obligations 
enshrined in treaties they have not ratified.10 Furthermore, states commonly interpret 
their human rights instruments as jurisdictionally limited to individuals or entities 
within their effective control.11 It is, in other words, difficult to argue that states have 
specific obligations to undertake positive action to secure the protection of human 
rights associated with climate change impacts beyond their territorial boundaries. 
Finally, states’ discretion in choosing the means for implementing their international 
obligations renders striking a balance between competing societal interests and needs 
                                                
7  Human Rights Council Resolution 7/23, Human Rights and Climate Change, UN Doc 
A/HRC/7/78, 29 March 2008; 10/4, Human Rights and Climate Change, UN Doc A/HRC/RES/10/4, 
25 March 2009, preamble; Human Rights Council Resolution 18/22, Human Rights and Climate 
Change, UN Doc A/HRC/RES/18/22, 17 October 2011, preamble; and Human Rights Council 
Resolution 26/27, Human Rights and Climate Change, UN Doc A/HRC/RES/26/27, 15 July 2014, 
preamble. 
8 Resolution 26/27, supra note 7, at 7. 
9 Open Letter from Special Procedures Mandate-holders of the Human Rights Council to the 
State Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change on the occasion of the meeting of 
the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action in Bonn (20-25 October 
2014), 17 October 2014, available at: http://newsroom.unfccc.int/media/127348/human-rights-open-
letter.pdf. 
10  While 197 States have ratified the UNFCCC, no human rights treaty enjoys universal 
ratification. Even the most widely ratified human rights treaties do not enjoy universal membership. 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) has 168 Parties; and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966) has 164 Parties. The UN Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1966) has 177 Parties whereas only 22 States have 
ratified International Labour Organization Convention 169 Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples 
in Independent Countries (1989).  
11 As reiterated for example also in: Report of the Special Rapporteur on the issue of human 
rights obligations relating to the enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment, supra 
note 4, at 41. 
 a rather context-specific matter, on which legislators enjoy a great deal of leeway.12 
 
 
These arguments were forcefully made in the lead up to the adoption of the Paris 
Agreement.13 As a result, the Paris Agreement only partially follows the suggestions 
made by the special procedures mandate-holders. The preamble specifies that Parties 
‘should, when taking action to address climate change, respect, promote and consider 
their respective obligations on human rights.’14 The operative part of the Paris 
Agreement also makes specific references to the need to be responsive to gender 
concerns as well as to the rights of indigenous peoples.15 Albeit timid, these textual 
references break new ground, and may have significant implications for the 
interpretation and further development of Parties’ obligations under the climate 
regime. 
 
 
This chapter analyses these recent developments, placing them in the context of the 
scholarly debate on the fragmentation of international law. This literature has 
investigated at length questions of coherence within and interplay between sectors of 
the international legal order. It is used here as a conceptual lens to better understand 
interactions between international human rights and climate change law, as well as the 
means available to manage the interplay between the two. The chapter is structured as 
follows. The second section introduces the debate on fragmentation of international 
law, as well as tools that have been devised to tackle it. The third section analyses 
how the tools identified in the scholarship on fragmentation have been deployed to 
address the interplay between the climate change and the human rights regimes. The 
conclusion offers some reflections on future interrelations between these two regimes. 
 
 
                                                
12  As argued also in Quirico, Brömer and Szabó, ‘States, Climate Change and Tripartite 
Human Rights: The Missing Link’ in Quirico and Boumghar, supra note 6, at 21. 
13 As reported for example in Human Rights Watch, ‘Human Rights in Climate Pact under 
Fire’ (7 December 2015), available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/12/07/human-rights-climate-
pact-under-fire. 
14 Paris Agreement, Preamble. 
15 Paris Agreement, Articles 7.5 and 11.2. Cross-reference to chapters on IPOs and gender.  
 2 The fragmentation of international law 
 
The debate on the fragmentation of international law emerges from concerns that 
international law-making and institution-building increasingly tends to take place 
‘with relative ignorance of legislative and institutional activities in the adjoining fields 
and of the general principles and practices of international law.’16 The perceived 
compartmentalization of the law into highly specialized branches that develop in 
relative autonomy from each other is not only inter-specific, i.e. between different 
areas of the law (e.g. environmental law, human rights law, trade law, etc.), but also 
intra-specific, thus affecting instruments belonging to the same area of international 
law (e.g. climate change law, biodiversity law, etc.). This state of affairs is arguably 
the result of institutional deficiencies of the international legal system, which is 
inherently devoid of a clear normative and institutional hierarchy and a 
comprehensive judicial jurisdiction,17 as well as of the progressive transposition of 
governance functions from the national to the international plane.18  
 
 
After two decades of debate, fragmentation is widely accepted as an intrinsic 
characteristic of the international legal order. So while early scholarship focused on 
problematizing fragmentation,19 more recent scholarship acknowledges fragmentation 
as part of the natural state of things, and rather focuses on ways to manage it.20 How, 
in other words, is it possible to enhance the coherence between elements in the 
international legal architecture, avoiding the threat of ‘antagonistic developments’?21 
                                                
16 ILC, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and 
Expansion of International Law. Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, UN 
Doc A/CN.4/L.682, 13 April 2006, at 11.  
17 Ibid., at 493. 
18  Simma, ‘Universality of International Law from the Perspective of a Practitioner’ 20 
European Journal of International Law (2009) 265, at 270. 
19 See e.g. G. Teubner, Global Law Without a State (1997); and Fischer-Lescano and Teubner, 
‘Regime-Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law’ 25 
Michigan Journal of International Law (2003) 999. 
20  See for example M. Young (ed.), Regime Interaction in International Law: Facing 
Fragmentation (2012); R. Michaels and J. Pauwelyn, ‘Conflict of Norms or Conflict of Laws?: 
Different Techniques in the Fragmentation of Public International Law’ 22 Duke Journal of 
Comparative & International Law (2012) 349; and H. van Asselt, The Fragmentation of Global 
Climate Governance: Consequences and Management of Regime Interactions (2014). 
21 For the use of this term, see Pollack and Shaffer, ‘The Interaction of Formal and Informal 
Lawmaking’ in J. Pauwelyn, R. A. Wessel and J. Wouters, Informal International Lawmaking (2012), 
at 250-4. 
 And what is the relationship between rules embedded in separate but overlapping 
international regimes? 
 
 
The International Law Commission (ILC) addressed these matters in one of its 
reports.22 The report points out that the increased specialization of international law 
poses challenges associated with the collision of norms and regimes, deploying the 
term ‘conflict’ to refer to a situation whereby ‘two rules or principles suggest different 
ways of dealing with a problem’.23 This definition encompasses not only mere ‘logical 
incompatibility’ between norms, but also ‘policy-conflicts’, i.e. when a treaty 
frustrates the goals of another without there being any strict incompatibility between 
their provisions.24 These conflicts have been also described in the literature as 
‘implementation conflicts’ - i.e. conflicts that are engendered by implementation of 
perfectly compatible treaty obligations25 - or ‘functional conflicts’- i.e. interference in 
the operation of concurrent norms, that takes place for example when a norm 
reinforces the behaviour another seeks to discourage.26 The notion of policy conflict 
draws attention to the fact that interaction between international law regimes in not a 
one-off phenomenon, but concerns the ‘day-to-day working’ of legal instruments, 
starting from their very making and continuing with their interpretation and 
implementation.27 So, rather than simply focus on establishing the applicable legal 
regime and related set of rules in a given context, scholars are increasingly presuming 
that multiple international regimes interact with one another in an iterative manner 
and searching for constructive ways of making them work together. 28 
 
 
The ILC report considers three main avenues to address policy conflicts: conflict 
avoidance; resolution through the application of interpretative principles; and 
institutional cooperation and coordination. On conflict avoidance, the report suggests 
                                                
22 ILC, supra note 16. 
23 Ibid., at 25. 
24 Ibid., at 24. 
25 R. Wolfrum and N. Matz, Conflicts in International Environmental Law (2003), at 24.  
26 M. Prost, The Concept of Unity in Public International Law (2012), at 63. 
27 See Young, Regime Interaction in Creating, Implementing and Enforcing International Law, 
in Young, supra note 20, at 89 and 91.  
28 Dunoff, ‘A New Approach to Regime Interaction’ in Young, supra note 20, at 137 and 157. 
 including in treaties guidance on how to deal with subsequent or prior conflicting 
treaties, distinguishing different typologies of so-called conflict clauses.29 These 
clauses typically specify that a treaty ‘is subject to,’ or that ‘it is not to be considered 
as incompatible with, an earlier or later treaty,’ or that ‘the provisions of that other 
treaty prevail’. The report nevertheless, recognizes the limits to such clauses, which 
oftentimes merely ‘push’ the resolution of problems to the future.30 
 
 
On treaty interpretation, the ILC points to rules in the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties (VCLT)31 as the ‘tool-box’ for dealing with fragmentation.32 The VCLT 
codifies treaty interpretation rules that are commonly regarded as an embodiment of 
customary international law.33 Whilst recognising that VCLT rules give insufficient 
recognition to special types of treaties and rules concerning their interpretation and 
implementation, the ILC points to the continued relevance of these rules to dealing 
with conflict of norms.34  
 
 
In particular, the report underscores the role of systemic integration as an aid to deal 
specifically with policy conflicts.35 Systemic integration suggests that when creating 
new obligations, states are assumed not to derogate from existing ones, as embodied 
in any rules of international law that are both ‘relevant’ and ‘applicable’ in the 
relations between the Parties.’ 36 The rationale behind this interpretation tenet is quite 
simple: rights and obligations established by treaty provisions exist alongside rights 
and obligations enshrined in other treaties. As none of these rights or obligations has 
any intrinsic priority against the others, the ILC suggests that their relationship be 
approached through a process of reasoning that ‘makes them appear as parts of some 
                                                
29 ILC supra note 16, at 278-281. 
30 ILC supra note 16, at 276. 
31 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 8 International Legal Materials, 
679 (entered into force: 27 January 1980) (hereinafter the ‘VCLT’). 
32 ILC, supra note 16, at 250. 
33 Cf. e.g. Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1994, 
at 41; Kasikilil/Sedudu Island (BotswanalNamibia), Judgement, ICJ Reports 1999, at 18; LaGrand 
(Germany v. United States of America), Judgement, ICJ Reports 2001, at 99. 
34 ILC supra note 16, at 251. 
35 ILC, supra note 16, at 410-480. 
36 VCLT, Article 31.3(c). 
 coherent and meaningful whole.’37 Such systemic thinking is arguably part of the very 
essence of legal reasoning, and perhaps the only possible solution to the ‘clustered’ 
nature in which legal rules and principles appear.38  
 
 
In times of increasing fragmentation of the international legal order, systemic 
integration has unsurprisingly been the subject of much scholarly attention.39 Some 
scholars have cautioned against the dangers of conflating treaty ‘interpretation’ with 
treaty ‘modification’,40 pointing out that the presumption of coherence is to be 
‘handled with care’ and assessed on a ‘case by case basis,’ as states may indeed have 
adopted the new instrument with the specific purpose to do away with their extant 
international commitments.41 Admittedly, systemic integration may only resolve 
‘apparent’ conflicts, and not instances of actual incompatibility.42 Systemic integration 
therefore tends to operate before an irreconcilable conflict of norms has arisen, and 
provides a tool to engender coherence in international law, 43 by urging the 
interpretation of state obligations in as much as possible in an integrated fashion.  
 
 
Finally, the ILC report sets aside the question of institutional interaction, expressing 
the conviction that ‘the issue of institutional competencies is best dealt with by the 
                                                
37 ILC, supra note 16, at 414. 
38 Ibid., at 35. 
39 For example, McLachlan, ‘The Principle of Systemic Integration and Article 31(3)(c) of the 
Vienna Convention’ 54 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (2005) 279; Klabbers, 
‘Reluctant Grundnormen: Articles 31(3)(c) and 42 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
and the Fragmentation of International Law’ in M.C.R. Craven, M. Fitzmaurice and M. Vogiatzi (eds), 
Time, History and International Law (2007); Linderfalk, ‘Who Are “The Parties”? Article 31, 
Paragraph 3(c) of the 1969 Vienna Convention and the “Principle of Systemic Integration” Revisited’ 
55 Netherlands International Law Review (2008) 343; Pavoni, ‘Mutual Supportiveness as a Principle 
of Interpretation and Law-Making: A Watershed for the “WTO-and-Competing-Regimes” Debate?’ 21 
European Journal of International Law (2010) 649; Samson, ‘High Hopes, Scant Resources: A Word 
of Scepticism about the Anti-Fragmentation Function of Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties’ 24 Leiden Journal of International Law (2011) 701. 
40 Simma and Kill, ‘Harmonizing Investment Protection and International Human Rights: First 
Steps Towards a Methodology’ in C. Binder, U. Kriebaum, A. Reinisch, and S. Wittich (eds), 
International Investment Law for the 21st Century: Essays in Honour of Christoph Schreuer (2009), at 
692-4. The same view is expressed in R.K. Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (2008), at 266. 
41 Simma, ‘Foreign Investment Arbitration: A Place for Human Rights’ 60 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly (2011) 573. 
42 ILC, supra note 16, at 42. 
43  McLachlan, supra note 39, at 318. Similarly, B. Chambers, Interlinkages and the 
Effectiveness of Multilateral Environmental Agreements (2008), at 248. 
 institutions themselves’.44 This matter has nevertheless subsequently been addressed 
in a literature strand that builds upon international relations theories on interplay 
management.45 One of the most important studies on the issue distinguishes between 
various levels of coordination and institutionalisation, ranging from the macro-level, 
where the interplay between regimes is managed by an overarching institution, to the 
micro-level, where interplay management is left to the autonomous efforts of national 
governments.46  
 
The next section considers how the techniques suggested in the ILC report and in the 
literature may be used to make sense of the interplay between climate change and 
human rights instruments.  
 
 
3 Addressing conflicts between the climate change and the human rights 
regime 
 
By virtue of its subject matter, the climate regime is particularly likely to overlap with 
other international regimes, and, as such, it is particularly prone to policy conflicts.47 
This is especially the case in relation to human rights law. So whereas in principle 
there is no incompatibility between these two sets of international norms, in practice 
policy conflicts between the two have emerged. This section considers how tools to 
manage the fragmentation of international law have been deployed and may be 
deployed in future as an aid to address the interplay between the human rights and the 
climate change regimes. The role of conflict avoidance techniques, such as conflict 
                                                
44 ILC, supra note 16, at 13 
45 See for example S. Oberthür and O.S. Stokke, Managing Institutional Complexity: Regime 
Interplay and Global Environmental Change (2011); Young, supra note 27; and van Asselt, supra note 
27.  
46  Oberthür, ‘Interplay Management: Enhancing Environmental Policy Integration Among 
International Institutions’ 9 International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 
(2009) 371, at 375-6. 
47 On the issue, see for example van Asselt, Sindico and Mehling, ‘Global Climate Change 
and the Fragmentation of International Law’ 30 Law & Policy (2008) 423, at 424; Carlarne, ‘Good 
Climate Governance: Only a Fragmented System of International Law Away?’ 30 Law & Policy 
(2008) 450, at 450; Haines and Reichman, ‘The Problem That Is Global Warming: Introduction’ 30 
Law & Policy (2008) 385–393, at 385; and McNeely, ‘Applying the Diversity of International 
Conventions to Address the Challenges of Climate Change’ 17 Michigan State University College of 
Law Journal of International Law (2008) 123. 
 clauses and systemic integration, is considered first, to then look at institutional 
cooperation as a means to better integrate human rights concerns into climate change 
action. 
 
 
3.1 Conflict clauses 
 
Neither the UNFCCC nor the Kyoto Protocol includes a conflict clause. Nevertheless, 
the Cancún Agreements say that Parties ‘should, in all climate change related actions, 
fully respect human rights.’48 Because of its hortatory tone, and the fact that it was 
included in a COP decision, rather than in treaty text, the all-embracing reference to 
human rights in the Cancún Agreements was not particularly contentious.  
 
 
Conversely, the inclusion of a textual reference to human rights in the Paris 
Agreement was hotly debated.49 On the one hand, some Parties supported the 
inclusion in the Paris Agreement of a blanket reference to human rights - e.g. ‘All 
Parties (…) shall ensure respect for human rights and gender equality in the 
implementation of the provisions of this Agreement’.50 On the other, some Parties 
expressed reservations, based on the fact that not all states have ratified international 
or regional human rights treaties.51  
 
 
The possibility to address this tension by means of a conflict clause was put forward 
in a report by the International Law Association (ILA), which suggests the following 
formulation: ‘states shall formulate, elaborate and implement international law 
relating to climate change in a mutually supportive manner with other relevant 
                                                
48 Decision 1/CP.16, The Cancun Agreements: Outcome of the Work of the Ad Hoc Working 
Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action under the Convention, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1, 15 
March 2011, at 8. 
49 For an overview of references to human rights in the Paris Agreement negotiating text, see: 
Annalisa Savaresi and Jacques Hartmann, ‘Human Rights in the 2015 Agreement’ (Legal Response 
Initiative 2015), available at: http://legalresponseinitiative.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/05/LRI_human-rights_2015-Agreement.pdf. 
50  UNFCCC, Negotiating Text, 12 February 2015, available at: 
https://unfccc.int/files/bodies/awg/application/pdf/negotiating_text_12022015@2200.pdf, at 12bis. 
51 Human Rights Watch, supra  note 12. 
 international law.’52  Such a conflict clause formulation would not create new 
obligations for states that are not Parties to human rights treaties already. Instead, it 
would merely underscore states’ existing obligations in relation, inter alia, to human 
rights, signalling to Parties that these too should be taken into account when 
implementing the Paris Agreement. The importance of this interpretative guidance 
would be limited, but not insignificant. As by its own nature the climate regime is 
prone to policy conflicts with other international instruments, reminding states of the 
need to align also with these when implementing climate treaties seems important. 
Not only would a conflict clause have the effect to emphasise that Parties should take 
their existing human rights commitments into account when they implement the Paris 
Agreement. It would also provide an important signal for institutions within and 
without the climate regime on the need to consider human rights in their guidance and 
standards concerning climate change response measures. 	
	
	
No conflict clause was eventually included in the Paris Agreement, or even made it in 
the negotiating text.  Nevertheless, the Paris Agreement’s preamble points to Parties’ 
‘respective human rights obligations’. This reference draws attention to Parties’ 
obligations under treaties they have ratified already, or may ratify in future, rather 
than foreshadowing new ones. Even with this limited remit, this preambular reference 
is not devoid of legal consequence. Preambular text carries political and moral 
weight. By forging an explicit link with human rights instruments, the Paris 
Agreement’s preamble engenders an expectation that Parties will take into account 
their existing human rights obligations concerning matters such as, for example, 
public participation, or the rights of women and indigenous peoples when they adopt 
climate change response measures. So in spite of its limited legal force and the lack of 
a conflict clause, the reference to human rights in the Paris Agreement is in many 
connections groundbreaking. This is especially so in relation to the interpretation of 
Parties’ obligations under the new treaty. The next section looks at this issue in detail.   
 
                                                
52  International Law Association, Legal Principles Relating to Climate Change, (2014), 
available at: http://www.ila-hq.org/en/committees/index.cfm/cid/1029, Draft Article 10.1. Draft Article 
10.3(b) included a specific textual suggestion on human rights, according to which: ‘States and 
competent international organizations shall respect international human rights when developing and 
implementing policies and actions at international, national, and subnational levels regarding climate 
change’. 
  
3.2 Treaty interpretation and systemic integration 
 
The ILC report points out the fact that conflict resolution maxims, such as lex 
specialis derogat generali, have clear limitations in addressing policy conflicts such 
as those engendered by overlaps between the climate and human rights regimes.53 
Identifying what is to be regarded as lex specialis, for example, may be difficult with 
regimes that tend to be all encompassing in scope.54 Similarly, the lex posterior rule is 
of limited utility, when dealing with ‘living instruments’ that are constantly kept 
under review by their treaty bodies, such as those on climate change.55 As a result, the 
ILC rather suggests relying upon systemic integration to deal with policy conflicts. 
Consequently, state obligations under climate treaties should be interpreted in a way 
that is mutually supportive, rather than conflicting with, obligations under other 
treaties, including human rights ones.  
 
 
In the lead up to the adoption of the Paris Agreement, a string of HRC resolutions 
drew attention to potential conflicts, overlaps and synergies between the climate 
change and human rights regimes.56 These decisions underscore the need for policy 
coherence, thus implicitly making reference to systemic integration in the 
interpretation of states’ obligations concerning human rights and climate change. 
Most saliently in 2014 the (then) Independent Expert on Human Rights and the 
Environment issued a report on the human rights threatened by climate change and 
the human rights obligations relating to climate change.57 This report was the first 
comprehensive effort to systematically map the human rights affected by climate 
                                                
53 ILC, supra note 16, at 22. 
54 As argued also in Wolfrum and Matz, supra note 25, at 170-173; Chambers, supra note 42, 
at 50-60; and van Asselt ‘Managing the Fragmentation of International Environmental Law: Forests at 
the Intersection of the Climate and Biodiversity Regimes’ 44 New York University Journal of 
International Law and Politics (2012) 1205, at 1250-1252. 
55 As argued also in Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law, supra note 20, 
at 378; and van Asselt, supra note 54, at 1250-1252.  
56 Supra note 7 and corresponding text. 
57 Independent Expert on the issue of human rights obligations relating to the enjoyment of a 
safe, clean, healthy, and sustainable environment, Mapping Human Rights Obligations Relating to the 
Enjoyment of a Safe, Clean, Healthy and Sustainable Environment, Focus report on human rights and 
climate change, June 2014, available at: http://srenvironment.org/mapping-report-2014-2/  
 change, as well as relevant guidance adopted by human rights bodies, thus providing 
an important vademecum for systemic integration.  
 
The Paris Agreement’s preambular reference may be read as an invitation to practice 
systemic integration in the interpretation of Parties’ obligations, at least insofar as 
human rights are concerned. Well ahead of the adoption of the Paris Agreement, such 
an approach has already been experimented with in some areas of the climate regime, 
where potential conflicts with human rights obligations are particularly evident. As 
other contributions in this volume show,58 matters like REDD+59 and climate finance60 
have already confronted states and international agencies with challenging questions 
over the interplay between climate change and human rights law. COP decisions on 
REDD+ already make reference to systemic integration.61 The need to ensure 
compatibility with human rights has instead been specifically emphasised by one of 
the international agencies facilitating REDD+, which has adopted a human-rights-
based approach to its work,62 including specific free prior consent guidelines 
elaborated in partnership with human rights bodies.63 Equally, standards adopted by 
some climate finance institutions specifically refer to human rights.64 In both 
                                                
58 Crossreference to Delgado’s chapter. 
59 As argued for example in Savaresi, ‘The Human Rights Dimension of REDD’ 21 Review of 
European Comparative & International Environmental Law (2012) 102; Savaresi, ‘REDD+ and 
Human Rights: Addressing Synergies between International Regimes’ 18 Ecology and Society (2013) 
5; Savaresi, ‘The Role of REDD in Harmonising Overlapping International Obligations’ in E. Hollo, K. 
Kulovesi and M. Mehling (eds), Climate Change and the Law. A Global Perspective (2013). 
60 As argued for example in Johl and Lador, ‘A Human-Rights Based Approach to Climate 
Finance’ (Friederich Ebert Stiftung 2012), available at: http://library.fes.de/pdf-
files/iez/global/08933.pdf; and D. S. Olawi, The Human Rights-Based Approach to Carbon Finance 
(2016). 
61 Decision 1/CP.16, supra note 48, Appendix I, at 2 (a), where specific reference is made to 
the fact that REDD+ actions ‘complement or are consistent with the objectives of national forest 
programmes and relevant international Conventions and agreements’. 
62 See e.g. UN-REDD Programme Social and Environmental Principles and Criteria (2012), at 
2. 
63 UN-REDD Programme, Guidelines on Free, Prior and Informed Consent (2012), available 
at: http://www.un-redd.org/Launch_of_FPIC_Guidlines/tabid/105976/Default.aspx; and UN-REDD 
Programme, Legal Companion to the UN-REDD Programme Guidelines on FPIC (2012), available at: 
http://www.unredd.net/index.php?view=document&alias=8792-legal-companion-to-the-un-redd-
programme-guidelines-on-fpic-8792&category_slug=legal-companion-to-fpic-guidelines-
2655&layout=default&option=com_docman&Itemid=134. 
64  See e.g. Adaptation Fund Environmental and Social Policy (2013), at 15: 
‘Projects/programmes supported by the Fund shall respect and where applicable promote international 
human rights’. GCF Environmental and Social Safeguards explicitly mention ensuring full respect of 
the human rights of indigenous peoples, and their FPIC, at least in certain circumstances. Compare: 
GCF, Guiding framework and procedures for accrediting national, regional and international 
implementing entities and intermediaries, including the fund’s fiduciary principles and standards and 
environmental and social safeguards, GCF/B.07/02, 7 May 2014, at 1.7. 
 connections, therefore, while not all countries seeking climate/REDD+ finance may 
have ratified human rights treaties, human rights protection has been elected as one of 
the criteria they should satisfy to obtain such finance.65  
 
 
Experience accrued thus far with REDD+ and climate finance standards is an 
important term of reference to understand how obligations under the Paris Agreement 
may be interpreted in light of human rights law and practice, as well as challenges 
that can emerge in this process. This experience is likely to be particularly useful in 
relation to inter-state collaboration through the so-called Sustainable Development 
Mechanism (SDM).66 In this connection, the Special Rapporteur on human rights and 
the environment has already drawn attention to the need to ensure that the latter 
mechanism incorporates strong social safeguards that accord with international human 
rights obligations.67 Institutional cooperation could be an important means to 
streamline human rights considerations into such safeguards. This section looks at this 
matter next. 
 
 
3.3 Institutional cooperation  
 
Ensuring that obligations under the climate regime are interpreted and implemented in 
line with states’ human rights obligations has long been left to the autonomous efforts 
of national decision-makers and single institutions, in what Sebastian Oberthür has 
aptly described as ‘autonomous’ or ‘unilateral interplay management’ 68 - as opposed 
to forms of interplay management, where such coordination endeavours are carried 
out by a set of institutions together, or by an overarching international institution. The 
risk that autonomous or unilateral interplay management ends in incoherence is 
palpable when one considers that standards concerning e.g. climate finance already 
differ greatly.  
                                                
65  These examples are further discussed in: Savaresi, ‘The Legal Status and Role of 
Safeguards’ in C. Voigt (ed.), Research Handbook on REDD+ and International Law (2016). 
66 Paris Agreement, Article 6.4. 
67  Letter from the Special Rapporteur on human rights and the environment to climate 
negotiators, 4 May 2016, available at: http://srenvironment.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Letter-to-
SBSTA-UNFCCC-final.pdf. 
68 Oberthür, supra note 45, at 376. 
  
 
In the lead up to the adoption of the Paris Agreement, human rights bodies became 
increasingly proactive in their efforts to engage with legal developments in the 
climate regime. HRC resolutions set the premises for increased institutional 
cooperation, by encouraging the Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights 
(OHCHR) and of the HRC Special Procedures mandate-holders to engage with the 
climate regime. Ensuing initiatives include the Special Procedures Mandate-holders’ 
open letter to climate negotiators issued in lead up to the adoption of the Paris 
Agreement,69 as well as OHCHR’s submissions on various matters under 
considerations at climate negotiations, such as gender, adaption, and the SDM,70 as 
well as the recent elaboration of expert recommendations on climate change and 
human rights.71 Especially notable in this context are the activities undertaken by the 
Special Rapporteur on human rights and the environment, who through his reports, 
statements and letters has made remarkable efforts to engage with the making of 
climate change law and to provide recommendations on how to better factor in human 
rights in climate change law and policy.72 
 
                                                
69 Open Letter from Special Procedures Mandate-holders, supra note 9. 
70 See: OHCHR response to UNFCCC Secretariat request for submissions on the Nairobi 
Work Programme: impacts, vulnerability and adaptation to climate change: Health impacts, including 
occupational health, safety and social protection, FCCC/SBSTA/2016/2, para 15(a)(i), 2016; OHCHR 
response to the UNFCCC Secretariat request for submissions on the Lima Work Programme on 
Gender: Views on possible elements and guiding principles for continuing and enhancing the work 
programme (SBI), FCCC/SBI/2016/L.16, paragraph 5, 2016; OHCHR response to the UNFCCC 
Secretariat request for submissions on the Paris committee on Capacity-Building: Views on the annual 
focus area or theme for the Paris Committee on Capacity-Building for 2017 (SBI), 
FCCC/SBI/2016/L.24, 2016; OHCHR response to UNFCCC Secretariat request for submissions on the 
Paris Agreement (APA): Views and guidance related to intended nationally determined contributions, 
adaption communications, the transparency framework, and the global stocktake, and for information, 
views and proposals on any work of the APA, FCCC/APA/2016/2, 2016; and OHCHR response to 
UNFCCC Secretariat request for submissions on the future UNFCCC Sustainable Development 
Mechanism: Regarding the rules, modalities and procedures for the mechanism established by Article 6, 
paragraph 4, of the Paris Agreement, FCCC /SBSTA/2016/2, para. 100, 2016. All submissions are 
available at: http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/HRAndClimateChange/Pages/UNFCCC.aspx 
71 The OHCHR hosted an expert meeting on climate change and human rights on 6 - 7 
October 2016 in Geneva. The Draft Recommendations elaborated at the meeting are available at: 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/HRAndClimateChange/Pages/ClimateChange.aspx 
72 Most notably: Report of the Special Rapporteur on human rights and the environment, 
supra note; and Letter from the Special Rapporteur on human rights and the environment to climate 
negotiators, supra note 67. The OHCHR has also been mandated to organise an expert meeting 
providing guidance on the same issue: Expert Meeting on Climate Change and Human Rights 6-7 
October 2016, Draft Recommendations available at: 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/HRAndClimateChange/Pages/ClimateChange.aspx. 
  
Arguably, the very inclusion of a reference to human rights in the Paris Agreement is 
the result of advocacy by key epistemic actors, such as the Special Rapporteur on 
human rights and the environment, and former United Nations High Commissioner 
for Human Rights Mary Robinson. Aside from this milestone achievement, however, 
it is hard to say how receptive the climate regime has been to human rights bodies’ 
progressive institutional cooperation efforts. Historically UNFCCC Parties have been 
reluctant to establish inter-institutional linkages. Even when they have done so, as, for 
example in the context of the Joint Liaison Group to enhance coordination between 
the UNFCCC, the Convention on Biological Diversity and the United Nations 
Convention to Combat Desertification, very limited results have been obtained, based 
on the argument that the Rio Conventions have a ‘distinct legal character, mandate 
and membership’.73 Institutional cooperation with human rights bodies could be 
trickier, as treaty membership is more heterogeneous than that of the Rio 
Conventions. Yet again, the inclusion of a reference to human rights in the Paris 
Agreement may be a game-changer in this connection. 
 
 
The HRC Special Procedures mandate-holders have, for example, invited UNFCCC 
Parties to launch a work program to ensure that human rights are integrated into all 
aspects of climate actions.74 The creation of a work program would constitute an 
institutional space for Parties to consider whether and how to better integrate human 
rights in the climate regime. The work program could also become a forum for Parties 
to exchange information on experience with integrating human rights into climate 
action and share good practices. Finally, a work program could discuss institutional 
linkages between climate change bodies and international and regional bodies with a 
specific mandate on the protection of human rights. For example, Parties could entrust 
the UNFCCC Secretariat to collaborate with the OHCHR to integrate human rights 
consideration into climate action. Moving forward, a dedicated grievance mechanism 
for those complaining for human rights violations specifically associated with the 
implementation of climate change response measures could be established, such as a 
                                                
73 See for example the position by the US in Views on the Paper on Options for Enhanced 
Cooperation Among the Three Rio Conventions, Submissions from Parties, UN Doc. FCCC/SBSTA/ 
2006/MISC.4, 23 March 2006, at 16. The same point was made by Australia, ibid., at 5. 
74 Open Letter from Special Procedures Mandate-holders, supra note 9. 
 Special Rapporteur on climate change and human rights.75 Alternatively, human rights 
considerations may be specifically factored into the mandate of existing grievance 
mechanisms, such as, for example, the Independent Redress Mechanism established 
under the Green Climate Fund. 
 
 
Inter-institutional cooperation could furthermore galvanise the use of extant human 
rights bodies as means to seek redress for human rights breaches associated with the 
implementation of climate change measures and/or impacts. There are already 
precedents of this happening in practice,76 and more may be in the pipeline, due to 
imaginative climate change litigations strategies emerging around the globe.77 The UN 
Universal Periodic Review (UPR) could be tasked to specifically highlight human 
rights concerns associated with climate change,78 and thus become a means to see how 
UNFCCC Parties address human rights concerns associated with climate change and a 
way to disseminate best practices. A dedicated institution to support the consideration 
of human rights issues could also be established under the climate regime. This 
institution could be untrusted with the task to promote the sharing between Parties of 
information and of good practices on the integration of human rights in climate 
action. To support this task, Parties could be required to report efforts to integrate 
human rights into climate actions and policies in their national communications, or as 
part of their reporting obligations under human rights instruments. 
 
 
 
                                                
75  Cf. the petition launched by Environmental Justice Foundation, available at: 
http://ejfoundation.org/petition/special_rapporteur  
76 For an example of how the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination has been applied in connection with REDD+ in Indonesia, see Savaresi, supra note 59; 
and Johnstone, ‘Indonesia in the “REDD”: Climate Change, Indigenous Peoples and Global Legal 
Pluralism’ 12 Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal (2011) 93. 
77 As suggested e.g. in Chia, Mueller and Warland, ‘Roundtable Summary - Human Rights & 
Climate Change: Connecting the Dots’ (UNICEF UK and UCL Global Governance Institute 2016), 
available at: https://www.ucl.ac.uk/global-governance/ggi-publications/john-knox-climatechange-
publication.  
78 This suggestion has been made in e.g. International Bar Association, ‘Achieving Justice and 
Human Rights in an Era of Climate Disruption’ (2014), available at: 
http://www.ibanet.org/PresidentialTaskForceClimateChangeJustice2014Report.aspx. 
 4 Conclusion: where next?  
 
As other chapters in this volume show, the interplay between human rights and 
climate change law is far from unproblematic.79  As not all Parties to the climate 
regime have ratified human rights treaties, adherence to Paris Agreement cannot be a 
means to impose upon states obligations enshrined in treaties they have not ratified. 
Furthermore, even for those states that do have human rights obligations, the 
conventional interpretation of the jurisdictional limitations of these obligations 
presently undermines arguments concerning the protection of human rights beyond 
state territorial boundaries. States’ margin of appreciation in implementing their 
obligations under both climate and human rights treaties is a considerable obstacle. 
Finally, thus far fundamental limitations in the climate regime have constrained 
synergies between human rights and climate change law, due to the primacy accorded 
to economic concerns and development in climate politics; the construction of climate 
change as a technocratic and scientific policy problem, rather than a human-centered 
one; and differences between mechanisms to assess compliance with climate 
obligations versus those used in the human rights regime. 
 
 
Even bearing these complexities in mind, states’ human rights obligations in relation 
both to the impacts of climate change and response measures have pervasive legal 
ramifications. With the adoption of the Paris Agreement, these ramifications have 
been put in the spotlight. The agreement is potentially a game changer, opening up 
new avenues to improve coordination and address synergies between distinct 
international legal regimes. This chapter has shown that techniques devised to address 
the fragmentation of international law have already been deployed in this connection. 
Whilst not a conflict clause, the Paris Agreement’s reference to human rights draws 
attention to systemic integration, at least for those Parties that have ratified human 
rights treaties already. Human rights bodies have underscored the potential for 
systemic integration, and there is evidence that, at least in some cases, institutions in 
the climate regime have attempted to address human rights considerations in the 
standards they adopted. At the institutional level, human rights bodies have 
                                                
79 Cross-reference to Jodain’s chapter. 
 increasingly engaged with the making of international climate change law, from the 
drafting of the Paris Agreement to the nitty-gritty decision-making of climate treaty 
bodies.  
 
Moving ahead, much more could be done to address the limitations of the climate 
regime: institutional cooperation could be systematised, and become instrumental to 
the streamlining of human rights considerations into the climate regime. Human rights 
bodies may even provide institutionalized pathways to monitor and sanction human 
rights violations associated with climate change and the implementation of climate 
change response measures. The Paris Agreement could thus become the foundation 
for unprecedented cross-fertilisation between international human rights and 
environmental law. Indeed, when an issue has over-arching implications for a range 
of different international regimes, it seems wise to emphasise and vigorously explore 
avenues for coordination.80 How far states will be willing to go down this route., 
however, largely remains to be seen. 
 
                                                
80  As suggested also in Boyle, ‘Climate Change and International Law – A Post-Kyoto 
Perspective’ 42 Environmental Policy and Law (2012) 333, at 342. 
